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I. INTRODUCTION
Today's judiciary, although a traditional institution, faces a changing world with
a multitude of ethical dilemmas unforeseen by the founders of our court system.
Because of the expanding population of the United States and the increasingly liti-
gious nature of society, judges must hear cases involving novel issues and multiple
parties. The rise in popularity of the class action' is one trend resulting from society's
increased interest in litigation. Concurrently, the judiciary must apply standards that,
although sufficient for simple, two-party litigation, do not adequately address the
needs of large class action litigation. One standard that judges must apply-a stan-
dard perhaps too restrictive for class actions-is Canon 3 of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Code of Judicial Conduct (Judicial Code) and the corresponding
federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455.2 These provisions set forth the
circumstances under which a federal judge must recuse, or disqualify, himself3 from
a case due to a conflict of interest.
Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc.4 highlights a troublesome
aspect of the Judicial Code and the federal statutes. In Union Carbide the trial court
judge in a class action circumvented the strictures of 28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455
by curing the aspects of her case that appeared to violate the statutes. Specifically,
section 455(a) mandates that a judge recuse himself whenever there is an appearance
of bias, or where his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." '5 In Union
Carbide the district judge, while hearing a class action suit, married a man whose
tax-free retirement account contained stock in two corporations that were members of
the plaintiff class, which consisted of over 172,000 members. 6 The judge was un-
aware at the time of her marriage that her husband owned the stock and thus un-
knowingly fell into the scope of the statute. In the appellate court's words, this case
involved an "unlikely confluence of a class action, a judge's marrying pendente lite,
and a tax-free retirement account.'' 7 The judge had no actual knowledge of the
connection, and as soon as she received actual knowledge, her husband sold the
stocks in question. The judge ruled that by having her husband take this action she
had removed any appearance of partiality and thus did not violate the statute.8 The
1. See discussion of class actions in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1982).
3. For simplicity, the author chooses to refer to all judges, male and female, in the masculine.
4. 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1974).
6. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 712. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80 C 3479 (N.D. 1il. Sept. 24, 1985)
(,VESTLAW, Federal library, Dist file) at 2.
7. Id. at 713.
8. Industrial Gas, No. 80 C 3479, at 20, 21. The judge also received advice from the Advisory Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Citing Advisory Opinion 69, the Committee noted that the terms of § 455(b)
are couched in the present tense, and therefore, once the judge removed her interest, she would not be in violation of the
statute. Id.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
judge's refusal to disqualify herself was upheld on appeal. 9 However, a vigorous
dissent described the decision as unacceptable statutory manipulation. '0
The purpose of this Note is to argue for reform of judicial disqualification
statutes, particularly section 455. This Note will first discuss the general concept of
recusal, including the legislative intent, construction, and judicial history of 28
U.S.C. section 455. Next, the Note will point out the peculiarities of class actions and
the difficulties encountered in applying section 455 to complex, multi-party litiga-
tion, focusing particularly on Union Carbide. The Note will outline and assess some
of the suggestions for and criticisms of reform, discuss the constitutional dimensions
of recusal, and argue for reform that would give greater flexibility to a judge faced
with a class action. Specifically, the Note will conclude that the recusal statutes
should disallow recusal as a matter of course under circumstances such as those in
Union Carbide. Furthermore, instead of having to apply inflexible standards, judges
should be permitted to use more discretion and to take advantage of the peremptory
challenge, the judicial panel, and the statutory amendment. Finally, the recusal
statutes as they currently exist should be more narrowly interpreted in order to make
adjudicating class actions less complicated and more efficient and economical. Im-
plementation of these reforms will help restore public confidence in the judiciary by
giving credibility back to judges and upholding the appearance of impartiality.
II. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF RECUSAL:
LEGISLATIVE INTENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
The controlling statutory provisions for recusal in federal courts are embodied in
28 U.S.C. sections 144 and 455, which are adopted from the Judicial Code. Section
144, entitled "Bias or prejudice of judge," provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affadavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affadavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the
proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time.
A party may file only one such affadavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate
of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.'I
This provision, pertaining to actual conflicts of interest, is complemented by 28
U.S.C. section 455, pertaining to appearances of conflict. Section 455 sets forth the
grounds upon which a judge is to recuse himself. Section 455(a) is a general provi-
sion, mandating that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. '12 The legislative history of section 455(a) indicates that an objective
9. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 717.
10. Id. at 717 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
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standard governs recusal "to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the
judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting
the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let another judge preside
over the case."' 13
Section 455(b) is a particularized provision, pertaining to personal bias or prej-
udice concerning a party or personal evidentiary knowledge;14 previous association
with the matter in controversy through either private practice' 5 or appearance as a
material witness; previous service as a governmental employee either participating in
the proceeding or expressing an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case; 16 personal or familial financial interest in the matter in controversy or "any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceed-
ing;"' 7 and personal or familial relationship to a party in the proceeding, a lawyer in
the proceeding,' 8 one holding an interest in the proceeding, or one likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding.' 9 Legislative history indicates that "by setting
specific standards, Congress can eliminate the uncertainty and ambiguity arising from
the language in the existing statute and will have aided the judges in avoiding possible
criticism for failure to disqualify themselves." 20
Section 455(b) is enforced automatically upon filing of a sufficient affadavit and
requires no discretion on the part of the judge; the filing results in automatic recusal.
Section 455(a), on the other hand, is executed by the judge himself and applies to all
other situations not set forth in subsection (b). Section 455(a) requires the judge to
decide whether "an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts
underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
13. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADMIN. NEWs 6351,
6354-55.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). See generally L. AB.misoN, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr 21-22 (1986), which discusses the ABA Code, the precursor to § 455. Although Abramson discusses
state court cases, state courts following the Code are held to the same standard as federal courts. Commentators point out
that personal bias or prejudice is an elusive standard since it focuses on the thoughts of a judge. Only personal bias is
necessary for recusal, since a judge is expected to act according to his values. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972), proof that a judge's mind is "a complete tabula rasa" demonstrates lack of
qualification, not lack of bias. See E. TiODE, REPORTER'S NOTmS TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt 60-62 (1973). For
discussions of particular displays of personal bias or prejudice, see L. ABP.AsisoN, supra, at 22-37. In addition, the bias
must arise from an extrajudicial source, not from what the judge has learned while sitting on the case. For a discussion
of personal evidentiary knowledge, see L. ABMISON, supra, at 37-40.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). For a case discussing previous association with a matter in controversy through private
or previous practice, see United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1987) (disqualification mandated because
as state senator and private lawyer, judge had actively participated in the very events that were at issue in the suit and
involved himself in disputed evidentiary facts). Cf. Patterson v. Masem, 774 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985) (recusal not
required where party in civil rights case proposed it despite the fact that while judge practiced at his former law firm, the
firm represented intervening parties in desegregation case).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Financial interest is defined in § 455(d)(4) as "ownership of a legal or equitable
interest, however small" (emphasis added). Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 665 F. Supp. 873, 874
(D. Or. 1987). Cf. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 366-67 (4th Cir. 1976) (remote contingent possibility
of sharing in consumer refund does not reach level of legal or equitable interest).
18. See McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1983) (judge must disqualify himself where
relative in third degree is acting as lawyer in proceeding). Cf. Diversifoods, Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 133
(N.D. I11. 1984) (judge's spouse as member of law fi'rn representing defendant in unrelated matter not within statute).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 13, at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.IN. NEWs 6351, 6355.
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doubt that justice would be done in the case.' '21 Taken together, subsections (a) and
(b) follow the ABA's goal of maintaining and enforcing a "uniform set of ethical
standards for judges and thereby preserv[ing] the integrity of the judicary." 2 2
The concept of disqualification has been based historically on the right to due
process. An impartial court is a fundamental prerequisite to that right.23 The judge is
expected to maintain a distance from the litigants, but as the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals noted in United States v. Murphy,24 the definition of a "reasonable"
relationship between the judge and the parties to litigation "varies from time to time
as ordinary conduct of lawyers and judges changes.''2 5 The Murphy court also
pointed out that "[when John Marshall was the Chief Justice, the Justices and many
of the lawyers who practiced in the Supreme Court lived in the same boarding house
and took their meals together.' '26 Still, the Supreme Court has always favored judges
maintaining their distance from litigating parties: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process .... To this end no man can be a judge in his own
case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.' 27
Ill. DEFINING AN INTEREST: THE PECULIARITIES INVOLVED IN CLASS ACTIONS
The troublesome aspect of maintaining this ideal of impartiality is determining
what constitutes an interest in the outcome of a class action suit. This determination
can be difficult, time consuming, and very expensive; it may very well be impossible.
A judge faced with a large class action should be granted more discretion than one
hearing a two-party action in determining just how extensive his interest is. A typical
class action may involve a large class of corporations, each issuing publicly held stocks
of which a judge could own a small amount. Section 455(d) defines financial interest
as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small.' '2 This section goes
on to explain that the term "interest" does not include ownership in a mutual or
common investment fund;2 9 "an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fra-
ternal, or civic organization";30 a proprietary interest of a policyholder in connection
with a mutual insurance company or a mutual savings association when the outcome
of the proceeding will not "substantially affect the value of the interest"; 31 or own-
21. Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985).
22. L. ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 3.
23. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
24. 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985).
25. Id. at 1537.
26. Id. (citing White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L, REv. 1 (1984)).
27. In re Murehison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). See Virginia Elec., 539 F.2d at 367.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)(i). However, ifthejudge participates in the management of the funds, he will be deemed
to have an interest. Id. But see NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1987), appeal dismissed, 835
F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (disqualification of judge not warranted where investment club to which he belonged had
limited membership and was subject to majority vote).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)(ii).
31. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iii).
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ership of government securities as long as the outcome will not "substantially affect
the value of the securities. 32
A. Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc. and Section 455(b)
Congress failed to include in the section 455(d) exemptions the situation in which
ajudge's holdings in a corporation are a very small percentage of his total investments,
and the corporation is only one of several thousand class members in a class action.
This situation characterizes the facts of Union Carbide, a 1980 class action over which
Judge Susan Getzendanner presided for more than two years before marrying a man
whose retirement account contained some $100,000 worth of stock in IBM and
Kodak. 33 Neither of these corporations were named as parties to the litigation,
nor would it have seemed likely to a person without a technical background-a person who
did not know for example that liquid nitrogen is used by both companies for supercooling
in various technical processes-that either company would be a member of the plaintiff
class, limited as it was to buyers of oxygen, nitrogen, and argon. 4
In addition, there was no class list available when the judge got married. 35
In 1985, five years after filing the case, Union Carbide moved for Judge Getzen-
danner's recusal under section 455(b)(4), which provides that a federal judge shall
disqualify himself when "[h]e knows that he ... or his spouse ... has a financial
interest.., in a party to the proceeding. ' 3 6 Union Carbide informed Judge Getzen-
danner of this interest, 37 and she immediately ceased ruling on any motions while the
parties prepared briefs on the issue of her possible recusal.38 In the meantime, Judge
Getzendanner's husband sold the stock, and she thereafter resumed control of the
case. 39 During the interim, all motions were referred to another judge or a
magistrate. 40 The result was as if she had recused herself during the time her husband
held the interest and then was reassigned to the case after the financial interest had
been removed. 4'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge Getzendanner's actions,
finding:
Since the statute forbids only the knowing possesion of a financial interest, since Judge
Getzendanner relinquished control of the case as soon as she found out about the financial
32. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iv).
33. Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1986).
34. Id.
35. Judge Getzendanner stated that "[a] computer printout of the 172,001 names and addresses of the class is kept
under seal by the plaintiff's counsel, and has never been filed with the court." Industrial Gas, No. 80 C 3479, at 2.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
37. Counsel for defendant Union Carbide notified the judge by letter that IBM and Kodak were members of the
class and that her husband held stock in them. Industrial Gas, No. 80 C 3479, at 3.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 713. Judge Getzendanner noted that she and her husband suffered no adverse tax
consequences from the sale since the stocks were held in a retirement account. Industrial Gas, No. 80 C 3479, at 4. After
the sale, the judge and her husband sold all of his stocks because of her belief that such stock ownership was inconsistent
with her position in the federal judiciary. Id. at 13.
40. Industrial Gas, No. 80 C 3479, at 21 n.l.
41. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 714.
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interest, and since she did not resume control until the financial interest was eliminated, at
no time was she in literal violation of the statute.42
The court pointed out that "[m]any, probably most, federal judges . . . own, either
directly or through spouse or children, securities in individual corporations." 43 Fail-
ure to exempt these interests, therefore, can result in effectively disqualifying
"many, probably most" federal judges from hearing these cases. The court also
stated that in many class actions, the identities of all members of the class are
unknown until well into the litigation, and therefore, a strict application of the statute
would require all judges who own securities in individual corporations to recuse
themselves from any class actions involving corporations." "Class action judges
would be drawn from the subset of judges that happen not to own such securities,"
a reading of the statute that the court believed was not intended by Congress. 45
The House of Representatives, in response to such concerns, stated that a
"judge is free to invest. He should invest in companies which are not likely to
become litigants in his court. If that should happen, then he must disqualify
himself. "46 Although this sounds like an acceptable solution, one commentator has
pointed out a flaw in the House's reasoning. He said of the House of Representatives'
proposal:
[It] appears to be either disingenuous or naive; whichever its character, it makes no sense in
the real world. How can a judge anywhere in the federal court system be "free to invest"
in the largest corporations of America when those companies are repeatedly present in every
circuit, if not district, in the country? Contrary to the committee report's language, strict
application of this statute means that a judge or his family is definitely not free to invest in
any of the so-called "blue chip" securities that are traditionally considered among the best
investments. If he cannot invest in his local companies and he cannot invest in national
companies, in what can he invest? I suppose real estate on the other side of the country is
a possibility.47
The most recent call for judicial pay raises48 underscores the importance of
relaxing the recusal standard under the proper circumstances. Federal judges earn
significantly less than do attorneys in the private sector, 49 and those private sector
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 714-15.
45. Id. at 715.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 13, at 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADuN. NEws 6351, 6357.
47. Levy, Judicial Recusals, 2 PACE L. REv. 35, 41 (1982).
48. ABA President Robert Raven pointed to "judicial salaries of 20 years ago to demonstrate a 30 percent decline
in purchasing power as contrasted to the growth of comparable salaries in other fields," and Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh noted that "more federal judges left the bench between 1969 and 1986 than 'during the preceding 182 years
of the Republic."' Judicial Pay-Raise Fire Storm, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 19. "The ABA believes that a quarter of
the country's more than 1000 federal judges may choose to step down for financial reasons." Give Them a Raise, L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
49. While federal judicial salaries now range from $89,500 for a district judge to $115,000 for the chiefjustice
of the Supreme Court, private-sector legal salaries have skyrocketed. Major law firms in Los Angeles currently
pay their partners more than half a million dollars a year, and at big city firms across the country, some first-year
lawyers earn more than $80,000.
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attorneys have fewer restrictions on their investments.50 Although federal judges
"certainly don't expect to get rich on the bench,' '5 federal judges deserve to live at
a "level that neither deters entry nor forces premature departure; a level that allows
individuals short of old age, from modest backgrounds, and with family responsi-
bilities, to accept the challenge of judicial service; a level that does not progressively
penalize those dedicated individuals who choose to continue to serve." ' 52 Some
commentators assert that financial restrictions on federal judges could limit unac-
ceptably the pool of qualified judges to the point where federal judgeships will be
limited to "the narrow band of lawyers who are independently wealthy, personally
ascetic, ideologically driven, or insufficiently competent." 53 Because many qualified
judges and judicial candidates are being driven from the bench due to financial
considerations, a careful relaxation of the recusal statute-one that would not man-
date recusal in cases where a judge has a minimal financial interest in a corporate
party to a class action-could help enlarge the pool of interested judicial candidates
and retain current judges.
B. Union Carbide and Section 455(a)
Nonetheless, owning stocks that are in any way involved in a suit, regardless of
the size of the class and the size of the judge's investment, constitutes an appearance
of partiality as set forth in section 455(a). Advocates of the current requirement that
the judge's impartiality not reasonably be questioned assert that this strict standard
resolves the tension between a judge examining and weighing his own interest and a
judge merely applying the objective standards in section 455(b). Thus, as one com-
mentator argues, it is "unnecessary to probe deeply the facts concerning the chal-
lenged judge, reach conclusions about the likelihood of actual injustice, or describe
the judge as biased." 54 In other words, the presumption of bias eliminates the need
to determine whether there actually is bias.5 5 Congress intended section 455(a) to
apply to both actual conflicts and appearances of conflicts. This means that in order
for the statute to achieve its purpose of promoting public confidence in the judiciary,
it "does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an
appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or
she knew." 56
50. General insider trading sanctions include the following: Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Act; Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984), codified in § 21(d)(2)(A) through (C) of the 1934 Act;
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988), codified
at § 20A and § 21A, and amended §§ 15(f), 21(d), and 32(a) of the 1934 Act. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
51. Judicial Pay Raises, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 26, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
52. Id. (quoting Judicial Conference of the United States).
53. Id.
54. Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237, 278 (1987). See Com-
monwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); Allinson v. General Council of
Medical Educ. & Regis., [1894] 1 Q.B. 750 (C.A.); Note, Disqualification of Judges Because of Bias and Prejudice, 51
YALE L.J. 169, 172, 175 (1941).
55. Rex v. Justices of Sunderland, [19011 2 K.B. 357, 371-73 (C.A.).
56. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988).
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The Seventh Circuit in Union Carbide recognized the merits of this reading of
the statute, deeming its straightforward application to be appealing since it "spares
the judge from having to make decisions under an uncertain standard apt to be
misunderstood.'57 The court also recognized, however, that this reading can lead to
"occasional silly results."58 After determining that the objective criteria of section
455(b) were not violated, the court applied section 455(a). Union Carbide argued that
because Judge Getzendanner's husband was forced to incur a brokerage fee and a loss
of potential future earnings by selling the stock, the judge "might be sore at Union
Carbide, or, at least, . . . a reasonable person might think she would be sore." 59
Addressing this contention, the court stressed that "it is one thing to assume that
judges are human beings with the usual human emotions and another to attribute to
them a malevolent, a calculating vindictiveness.-60 Therefore, the court found that
even the broader standard of section 455(a) was not met and upheld the judge's
refusal to recuse herself.
C. Other Class Actions and Section 455(a)
Other courts have verbalized the shortcomings of the "appearance of partiality"
standard of section 455(a). The district court judge in In re Cement & Concrete
Antitrust Litigation61 expressed his frustration with this standard when after recusing
himself pursuant to the statutory mandate, he questioned how there can possibly be
a conflict or even an appearance of impropriety when a judge is not even aware of his
financial holdings. 62
The "appearance" standard must have limits. Some judges have been con-
fronted with parties who asserted not that there was an actual appearance of bias but
that there was a possible appearance of unfairness. 63 For example, in Diversifoods,
Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc.64 a party litigant attempted to have the judge disqualified
due to the possible appearance of unfairness. In this case the plaintiff filed a motion
for recusal based on the fact that the judge's husband was a member of the law firm
that represented the defendant in matters other than the pending litigation. 65 The
judge held that recusal was inappropriate when neither the judge's husband nor his
law firm was acting as a lawyer in the matter; that recusal was inappropriate when the
law firm did not have a financial or other substantial interest in the proceeding or the
defendant; and that there was therefore no appearance of impropriety. 66
Other courts have found the litigant's "possible appearance of unfairness"
argument to border on the absurd. In In re National Fire Insurance Co. of Pitts-
57. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 714.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 715.
60. Id. at 716.
61. 515 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Ariz. 1981).
62. Id. at 1081.
63. See In re National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 839 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988).
64. 595 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. I1. 1984)..
65. Id. at 134.
66. Id. at 137-40.
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burgh67 a party litigant attempted to have the trial judge removed from the case on the
basis that the judge's son represented the party's bank in a short-lived credit trans-
action for a fee of less than $10,000.68 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
this fact did not affect the judge's ability to be impartial, absent a suggestion that the
bank hired the attorney to appease the judge, that the fee was unusually high, that the
credit transaction entailed future engagements, or that the bank took the initiative in
establishing the attorney-client relationship. 69 The court stated that there "either is or
is not an appearance of impropriety; a 'possible appearance'-an appearance of an
appearance of impropriety?-is not a basis for disqualification. ' 70 A judge cannot be
expected to "bend over backwards" to disqualify himself at the mere expression of
dissatisfaction about his rulings in the case. 71
Not only is the strict standard subject to misguided interpretation by parties, but
it is also subject to abuse, and although no standard is faultless, the abuses of this
standard can be quite costly and time consuming. For instance, in SEC v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert72 the defendant attempted to have Judge Louis Pollack recuse
himself because of his wife's sale of part of her family assets to Bain Venture Capital,
a party unrelated to the defendant. As part of the sale contract, Bain was to "use its
best efforts to obtain the financing necessary for the consummation of the trans-
actions." 73 The defendant, pointing to its relationship with Bain as general consult-
ant, alleged:
[H]ypothetical decisions hereafter might be made by the Judge which would be favorable to
Drexel, albeit deservedly, and would be perceived by reasonable members of the public to
have been made because of the sale of [the family assets] to Bain Venture Capital. It is
suggested that Drexel would not want to bear the burden of such success. Or, on another
speculation, were there to be unfavorable decisions the reasonable public perception would
ascribe to them the failure of the stock sale to happen.74
Judge Pollack found such allegations to be "far-fetched," "ludicrous," and "mis-
chievous'"-"hardly a basis for a Judge to step aside," especially after hearing the
case for more than fifteen months. 75 Although the judge did not have to recuse
himself based on section 455, much litigation resulted from the recusal motion and
the requisite consideration given to it. Meanwhile, time and money were wasted
while the decision on the merits of the case was sidetracked.
Given the difficulty of applying section 455(a) to single-party litigation, fulfill-
ing this standard borders on the impossible in a class action in which a multitude of
parties are involved, all of whom carry potential conflicts. United States v. Studien-
67. 839 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 1227-28.
69. Id. at 1229-30.
70, Id. at 1230 n.*.
71. Id.
72. [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,051 at 90,913 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 90,915 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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gesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. 76 involved an antitrust suit in which the judge was faced
with the possibility of recusing himself because of a stock interest held by his wife.
That interest could have provided her a gain of thirty-six cents per year if the judge
ruled in favor of that corporation. 77 In In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litigation78
Chief Judge Muecke was forced to recuse himself upon plaintiff's motion after he had
entered seventy-five percent of the pretrial orders and had ruled on many motions,
and after he had sat on the case for more than five years. 79 The reason for the recusal
was that the judge's wife owned shares of stock in seven of the 210,000 class
members, the list of whom was on microfiche and was never viewed by the judge.
The court found that the most Judge Muecke's wife could possibly have gained from
a plaintiff's victory was between four and thirty dollars.80 Nonetheless, the judge was
compelled to recuse himself despite the fact that he felt no conflict and saw no
appearance of impropriety. He expressed his frustrations:
Given the number of participants in a large class action, it is not an easy matter to determine
whether a per se conflict exists .... In a complex multidistrict class action, the litigation
may be well underway before a comprehensive class list can be compiled. To switch judges
in mid-stream not only wastes judicial time and energy, but can constitute a substantial
administrative burden.... To transfer five and one-half years of work and paper to a new
judge seems unfair, not only to the parties, but to the unlucky transferee and will in all
likelihood be the occasion for delay. 8'
These criticisms are not trivial. Section 455 as applied to class actions cannot ade-
quately fulfill its purpose of maintaining confidence in the impartiality of the judi-
ciary. Instead, a mass of litigation results which appears more hypertechnical than
practical.
Arguments against statutory reinterpretations, such as those presented in Union
Carbide, have merit. Judge Flaum, dissenting in Union Carbide, stressed that section
455(b) could not be satisfied merely by curing the financial interest. He reasoned that
section 455(b) does not provide a "sell or disqualify" option, that courts should not
be allowed to manipulate statutory language, and that had Congress intended the
courts to read the language so liberally, it would have made that clear in the statute. 82
More generally, some commentators assert that "school must keep" 8 3 since today's
federal court system has a much higher number of judges than ever before. They
argue that the recusal standard should thus remain as it is or become even more strict,
76. 426 F. Supp. 143 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
77. Lempert, Rigid Disqualification Statute Goes Too Far, Legal Times Wash., Feb. 1, 1982, at 10, col. I
(discussing Studiengesellschaft Kohle). Because the party attached to the interest (Conoco) was not a party to the action,
the judge did not have to recuse himself. However, had Conoco been a party, the judge would have been required under
the statute to recuse himself, even though his wife would have possibly gained only thirty-six cents per year.
78. 515 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Ariz. 1981).
79. Id. at 1081.
80. Id. at 1080.
81. Id. at 1076.
82. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 717-18 (Flaum, 1., dissenting).
83. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw & Co,,rmtp. PRoBs. 43, 44 (1970).
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since in most districts or circuits a large number of judges is available to replace one
who has, or appears to have, a conflict. 84
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR AND CRITICIsMs OF REFORM
Critics of the present system stress consideration of revisions, such as an addition
to the statute, which would allow a judge who has devoted substantial time to a case
to be allowed to consider whether "the public interest in avoiding the cost of delay
of reassignment outweighs any appearance of impropriety arising from his continuing
with the matter to completion." 85 Further, these critics assert that a judge should be
allowed to consider what his or her potential gain would be in the event of a favorable
disposition, the cost of educating a new judge, the amount of financial risk involved,
and the length of delay, 86 while at the same time remembering that "to perform its
high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "87
Although it may appear to be straightforward, the statute has some crippling
vagaries when applied to class actions. For instance, when filing the affadavit re-
quired by section 144, what constitutes "timely and sufficient," which is the pre-
requisite for relief through disqualification? How does one effectively determine what
constitutes bias? 88 Surely an insignificant dollar amount is not enough to create a
sufficient basis for recusal from a large, complex, and lengthy case. Instead of
assuming that a judge is automatically biased whenever there is a financial stake in
one member of the class, litigants should put more faith in the judiciary and allow the
judge to determine whether his interest is large enough to create actual or apparent
partiality. Blackstone has said that "the law will not suppose a possibility of bias in
a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.' 89 This reasoning has been statu-
torily proposed in the past when applied to all types of litigation. 90
Questions such as what constitutes bias and who decides the degree of bias are
important. Also, one can argue that merely questioning the judge's partiality results
84. See, e.g., Id.
85. Cement & Concrete Antitrust, 515 F. Supp. at 1081. Chief Judge Meucke cites draft legislation for a possible
§ 455(f), reading as follows:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if any justice, judge, magistrate, or bankruptcy judge to whom a
matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter,
because of the appearance, after the matter was assigned to him, of a party in which he individually or as a
fidiciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest (other than an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome), a waiver of disqualification may be accepted from the
parties; in the absence of waiver, disqualification is not required if the judge determines that the public interest
in avoiding the cost of delay of reassignment outweighs any appearance of impropriety arising from his
continuing with the matter to completion.
Id. at 1081.
86. Id. at 1080-81.
87. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955)).
88. See, e.g., Comment, Disqualification of Federal District Judges-Problems and Proposals, 7 SEroN HALL L.
REv. 612 (1976) (discussing the difficulty in actually determining when a judge is biased).
89. 3 W. BLACKsONE, Comm,,e rAmss *361, quoted in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986).
90. See, e.g., dissenting view of Congressman David W. Dennis upon proposal of the current § 455 in H.R. REP.
No. 1453, supra note 13, at 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Nsws 6351, 6362-63.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in judicial hostility toward the moving litigant or an emotional trial upon denial of the
motion for recusal. 9 t
Supporters of the current statute reject suggestions for statutory reform on the
theory that a judge will be forced to examine and weigh his own interest and to
determine if the size of his financial interest (or the cost of divesting it) is substantial
relative to his entire worth. Supporters argue that the judicial economy resulting from
this introspective approach is not worth the inadequacies of an uncertain statutory
standard. 92
However, in the class action, the congressional goal of promoting public con-
fidence in judicial impartiality may be accomplished by actually giving the judiciary
at least some discretion to operate free of externally imposed standards. For example,
in Cement & Concrete Antitrust Judge Muecke advocated adding a section 455(f),
which would allow a judge to remain on a case if in the public interest "the cost of
delay of reassignment outweighs any appearance of impropriety arising from his
continuing with the matter to completion. ' 93 Although previously rejected by Con-
gress, Judge Muecke's proposal should be viable if limited to class action recusal
situations, in which the cost in dollars, time, and judicial administration is much
higher than in single-party cases. Justice Frankfurter believed in placing more faith
in the integrity of the judiciary:
There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within
it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside private views in discharging their
judicial functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and
that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are
entrusted. 94
Although Justice Frankfurter supported recusal where reasonable persons would find
bias, given his faith in the judiciary, he surely would not have gone so far as to say
that a judge who is unaware of his financial interest in a member of a class should
recuse himself.
Two congressmen who opposed enacting section 455 questioned, on a philo-
sophical and utilitarian level, how one may legislate judicial integrity. In a situation
in which a judge owned a small number of stocks, whether by inheritance or invest-
ment,
by legislative enactment, we could have a true Daniel come to judgment-or a Learned
Hand upon the bench ... [and] he absolutely could not sit, even though both parties to the
cause preferred him-because of his expertise, learning, and integrity-to any and all other
available members of the judiciary.95 ,
Neither critics nor supporters of the current system have contended that a judge
always starts from "dead center" when he sits on a case. Justice Cardozo believed
91. See Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REv. 109, 126-27 (1974).
92. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 718 (Flaum, J., dissenting). See H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 13, at 6,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6351, 6355.
93. See supra note 74.
94. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952).
95. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 13, at 15, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CO NG. & ADMIN. Ne,'s 6351, 6363.
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that judges are shaped by "the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man. . . . The
great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course,
and pass the judges by." ' 96 Accordingly, many courts support a judge's refusal to
recuse if the movant bases a recusal motion solely on the judge's philosophical
position. 97 They realize that judges "are not fungible." 98 One judge, focusing on the
misplaced priorities section 455(b) can give, noted that the "absolutist quality of the
standard is a false one" in that it appears to insulate the judge from improper
influence, while in reality it leaves stronger interests such as the judge's interest as
a citizen, a voter, or a taxpayer to the less stringent standard of section 455(a).99
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
Critics and supporters of the current system have argued that maintaining the
current standard in class action suits rises to a constitutional level. That is, in ruling
on recusal motions the federal judge "should regard himself as bound by the funda-
mental fairness doctrine of the Due Process Clause" as well as by federal statutes. 1oo
Supporters of the current statute contend that subjecting a party's liberty or property
to the judgment of a judge having a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest
in the outcome of a case arguably violates the fourteenth amendment.10 1 However,
what constitutes a "substantial interest" is not provided in section 455(b), and the
Supreme Court has held that "only in the most extreme of cases would disqualifi-
cation . . . be constitutionally required."'' 0 2
The other side of the constitutional argument is that limiting the pool of available
judges actually restricts effective due process:
The impact of recusals on the large corporation is both obvious and subtle. Obviously,
recusals limit the pool of judges available to hear a case. The stricter the ethical standards
the more recusals and the smaller the pool of judges. More subtly, some recusals affect the
type of judge left in the pool. For example, recusal standards which penalize intelligent
investors ... may well eliminate the types of jurists most able to comprehend the position
of the large corporation. 103
Thus, the strict standard as applied to class actions which affect investors can
deny class member companies access to "as full, balanced and representative a range
of judges as is available to other small litigants."'0 4 Furthermore, in the class action,
constitutional constraints are weakened. When a judge holds stock making up a very
small percentage of the total class, he reaches a point where the biasing influence will
96. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (1921).
97. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1966); In re Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943).
98. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 137.
99. See Lempert, supra note 77.
100. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1976).
101. Tuney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
102. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986).
103. Levy, supra note 47, at 36.
104. Id. at 37.
1989] 1303
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
be too remote and insubstantial to violate the due process clause. 0 5 One who pos-
sesses a tenuous interest through stock ownership in one or a few class members,
without knowledge of that interest, does not impinge on fair adjudicative process.
VI. PROPOSALS
Some commentators have suggested allowing peremptory challenges to federal
judges. 106 Upon filing an affadavit, regardless of its sufficiency or showing of actual
bias, a party would be assigned a replacement judge automatically, as a matter of
administrative procedure. In addition, a party would only get one peremptory chal-
lenge per suit. Thereafter, the litigant must accept the newly assigned judge or else
show good cause for recusal. Allowing litigants to receive only one peremptory
challenge per suit would take the judge-shopping aspect away from using peremp-
tories. In this way, the challenger need not give reasons for his belief in the judge's
impartiality. 107 In addition, filing the peremptory challenge in the affadavit should be
timely-a particularly important feature for complex and potentially lengthy class
action suits. That is, peremptories must be limited to the earliest stage of trial. 105 This
measure avoids discussion of bias, whether actual or apparent; it is merely an ex-
pression of preference by the movant; it protects the judge's reputation since no one
need look into the sufficiency of the allegations; and disqualification becomes an
administrative matter and is therefore quicker. 109
Critics of peremptory challenges in this context argue that this measure would
allow judge shopping and erosion or undercutting of the concept of an independent
judiciary. They point out that peremptories undermine the integrity of federal judges,
who already survive investigations by the ABA, the FBI, and the Senate Judiciary
Committee. 1 0 The criticism is well founded. However, the alternatives for a class
action can mean exponential costs in terms of time, money, and judicial administra-
tion. On the facts of Union Carbide, by examining the judge's disclosed financial
records, the moving party could have estimated whether any stock holdings of the
judge (that is, IBM and Kodak) could potentially have been involved. In turn, the
movant could have raised a peremptory challenge, even if the judge had no reason to
know of the potential conflict. Although this alternative may not be helpful in cases
in which class membership is unknown until well into the litigation, it can help in
situations in which at least the character of the class member is known.
Another suggestion has been to appoint a panel of disinterested judges whose
task would be to determine whether the recusal motion should be granted or
105. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980). This case involved a motion to disqualify a
regional administrator on the grounds that the administrator was biased towards plaintiff and therefore should recuse
himself. The court held that since a regional director is more akin to a prosecutor than to a judge, the disqualification
statute is not applicable. Therefore, despite showing an interest in the parties, the plaintiff failed to show a strong enough
interest to violate due process.
106. See Frank, supra note 83, at 65-67; Comment, supra note 88, at 633.
107. Leubsdorf, supra note 54, at 273.
108. See Comment, supra note 88, at 641. It is suggested that the United States Supreme Court define "earliest."
109. See generally, Comment, supra note 88.
110. See, e.g., Bartels, Peremptory Challenges to Federal Judges: A Judge's View, 68 A.B.A. J. 449 (1982).
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denied. " ' This solution would result in less chance of judicial hostility upon filing if
the panel found no bias, thereby vindicating the judge from any improper allegations.
The litigant would probably be satisfied with the panel findings since the panel would
be comprised of disinterested judges. An affadavit filed before such a panel should
be in hypothetical form to prevent the panel from identifying the judge or the parties.
The panel would be freed from the uncomfortable position of having to find partiality
in a specific colleague. " 2 Although creating a judicial panel appears to involve more
bureaucracy and tax dollars, in the long run both administrative effort and money will
be saved. Thus, in future cases similar to Union Carbide and Cement & Concrete
Antitrust, judges can first defer to the impartial panel in lieu of spending innumerable
hours hearing arguments and drafting opinions on the issue of their impartiality. In
turn, judges would be free to spend more time and effort deciding the more substan-
tive issues of the case or clearing the docket to hear more substantive cases.
Finally, Congress should reconsider Judge Muecke's proposal for a section
455(f). As with the judicial panel and the peremptory challenge, administrative time
and money would be saved by maintaining a practical perspective on recusal motions.
If a judge and the parties have expended years of work on a matter, "undoing" their
accomplishments should be allowed only after weighing the 'cost of delay of reas-
signment with any appearance of impropriety that would result from the judge's
remaining on the case.
VII. CONCLUSION
There exist a number of feasible solutions that would make complex class
actions more manageable when a party moves for recusal based on a judge's financial
interest in a class member. Although the existing statutes have been successful in
managing simple litigation, the peculiarities of class action suits demand special
attention. Judge Getzendanner's solution in Union Carbide of curing her interest was
very effective," 3 although much time and effort was spent disposing of the issue.
Instead of requiring the judge to formulate sophisticated means around the system,
the system should provide him with a simpler and far more effective standard.
Congress should consider the following possibilities: Allowing a peremptory chal-
lenge under limited circumstances; establishing a disinterested judicial panel for
hearing questions of bias; setting a minimum dollar amount on the interest based on
the relative size of the interest and the number of class members; permitting a
statutory provision allowing waiver when a judge has spent significant time on the
111. See Comment, supra note 88, at 633-41.
112. See id.
113. On occasion, similar results occur from divesting stock ownership. See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941, reh'g
denied, 404 U.S. 996 (1971) (trial judge's wife owned one hundred shares of stock of defendant corporation, yet judge
not required to recuse himself).
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case;1 14 and providing that a judge may remove or cure his interest by disposing of
it in order to remain on the case. Implementing these standards would reduce the
number of hours spent rehearing cases and educating newly assigned judges to
replace the recused judges. Many dollars would be saved in precluding unnecessary
and protracted litigation. Most importantly, these standards would help restore public
confidence in the judiciary by allowing judges to exercise their discretion and in turn
upholding the appearance of impartiality.
Diane C. Boniface
114. Although the ABA Code has a waiver provision based on financial grounds, as does § 455(a), § 455(b) does
not. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 13, at 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADitN. NEws 6351, 6357.
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